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The application of the most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
clause to investor-State dispute settlement provisions 
remains both an unsettled question in investment treaty 
arbitration1, and a controversial one. Legally, this is in 
part the consequence of the fact that bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) invariably use different language, making it 
necessary to interpret the applicable treaty on a case-
by-case basis. A difficulty also results from the fact that 
the MFN clause touches upon a fundamental principle 
of international dispute settlement, namely the consent 
of States, and the diverging views of arbitral tribunals 
on the essential features of expressing consent to 
arbitration. 
This brief article provides a critical examination of the 
tribunal’s decision in Garanti Koza LLP v. Turkmenistan,2  
where the majority took a particularly expansive reading 
of the MFN clause in the United Kingdom-Turkmenistan 
BIT.   
Background on the case 
The claimant, Garanti Koza LLP, a limited liability 
company incorporated in the United Kingdom (UK), 
submitted a request for arbitration to the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
claiming that Turkmenistan breached its obligations 
under the UK-Turkmenistan BIT. Specifically, Garanti 
complained of modifications to its contractual 
relations with the State-owned highway authority 
Turkmenavtoyollary in respect of the design and 
construction of highway bridges and overpasses in 
Turkmenistan, and Turkmenistan’s alleged attempts to 
confiscate its assets (para. 2). 
The respondent’s primary objection to the jurisdiction of 
the tribunal was based on the lack of consent to ICSID 
arbitration under the UK-Turkmenistan BIT (para. 7).  
Turkmenistan argued that consent to ICSID arbitration 
may not be “created by operation of the most favoured 
nation clause of the UK-Turkmenistan BIT” (para. 14). 
For its part, the claimant maintained that the MFN 
clause contained in the UK-Turkmenistan BIT allowed 
it to invoke more favourable dispute settlement clauses 
contained in other investment treaties signed between 
Turkmenistan and third States, and in particular third-
party treaties that give foreign investors the option 
between ICSID arbitration and arbitration under 
the UNCITRAL arbitration rules (or access to ICSID 
Arbitration only) (para. 15). 
In the long series of cases in which the application of 
the MFN clause to investor-State dispute settlement 
provisions contained in investment treaties has been 
discussed and analysed, the tribunal’s decision in 
Garanti Koza LLP v. Turkmenistan is noteworthy. 
The decision stands out for allowing the claimant to 
invoke and rely on consent to arbitration before ICSID 
expressed by the respondent state in another investment 
treaty through application of the MFN clause. While 
claimants have traditionally limited the invocation of 
the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions in 
order to override pre-arbitration requirements, such as 
waiting periods or requirements to submit the case first 
to domestic courts3, in this case the invocation of MFN 
clause was done to ‘import’ consent to ICSID arbitration 
in the United Kingdom-Turkmenistan BIT, which did not 
contain consent to ICSID arbitration. The tribunal’s July 
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3, 2013 decision on the objection to jurisdiction for lack 
of consent was supported by a majority composed of 
Presiding Arbitrator John M. Townsend and Arbitrator 
George Constantine Lambrou. Arbitrator Laurence 
Boisson de Chazournes disagreed with the findings 
of the majority and issued a dissenting opinion on this 
question. 
The decision of the tribunal
Article 8 of the UK-Turkmenistan BIT contains the 
investor-State dispute settlement clause. Considering 
its peculiar features, and the fact that the interpretation 
of the article formed the foundation of the majority’s 
decision and Arbitrator Boisson de Chazournes’ dissent, 
it is important to reproduce it in full:
(1) Disputes between a national or company of 
one Contracting Party and the other Contracting 
Party concerning an obligation of the latter 
under this Agreement in relation to an investment 
of the former which have not been amicably 
settled shall, after a period of four [months] from 
written notification of a claim, be submitted to 
international arbitration if the national or company 
concerned so wishes.
(2) Where the dispute is referred to international 
arbitration, the national or company and the 
Contracting Party concerned in the dispute may 
agree to refer the dispute either to:
(a) the [ICSID]
(b) the Court of Arbitration of the International 
Chamber of Commerce; or
(c) an international arbitrator or ad hoc 
arbitration tribunal to be appointed by a 
special agreement or established under the 
Arbitration Rules of the [UNICTRAL].
If after a period of four months from written 
notification of the claim there is no agreement 
to one of the above alternative procedures, 
the dispute shall at the request in writing of the 
national or company concerned be submitted 
to arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the 
[UNICTRAL]as then in force. The parties to the 
dispute may agree in writing to modify these 
Rules.
Article 3 of the applicable BIT contains an MFN clause 
which, as one finds in several UK BITs, confirms explicitly 
in its third paragraph that MFN treatment applies to the 
provisions relating to investor-State dispute settlement.
The tribunal first noted that consent to jurisdiction is a 
fundamental requirement in investment arbitration, and 
in international law generally, and that it must be based 
on an express declaration of consent or any other action 
that demonstrates consent. It cannot, according to the 
tribunal, be presumed (para. 21), nor should dispute 
resolution provisions be interpreted differently than other 
provisions of a treaty (para. 22).
The tribunal subsequently analysed whether in this case 
Turkmenistan had consented to ICSID arbitration. First, 
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the tribunal confirmed the need to have, under Article 
25 of the ICSID Convention, “consent in writing” (paras. 
24). Secondly, the majority engaged in a “two steps” 
approach to the question of consent, corresponding to 
the investor-State dispute settlement clause contained 
in Article 8 of the UK-Turkmenistan BIT. According to 
the tribunal, the first paragraph of Article 8 dealt with 
consent to arbitration, while the second paragraph dealt 
with “the arbitration systems that may be used if the 
conditions of Article 8(1) are met” (para. 25). The tribunal 
interpreted the first paragraph to mean that Turkmenistan 
consented to submit disputes with UK investors to 
international arbitration generally, under three conditions, 
namely: (1) that the investor “so wishes”; (2) that the 
dispute has not been settled within four months following 
a written notification of the claim; and (3) that the dispute 
concerns an obligation of one of the Contracting States 
under the treaty (para. 27). That the first two conditions 
were satisfied in this case was uncontested. Discussion 
of the third condition, namely whether the claims 
concerned a treaty or a purely contractual breach, was 
deferred to the decision on the merits (ibid.).
The question remained, however, whether this sufficed to 
establish consent to ICSID arbitration. The tribunal first 
noted that the use of the word “shall” in Article 8(1) made 
the statement mandatory (para. 28), and thus appeared 
to the majority “to establish unequivocally Turkmenistan’s 
consent to submit disputes with UK investors to 
international arbitration” (para. 29). The tribunal secondly 
analysed whether this consent involves consent to ICSID 
arbitration in particular, which is regulated in Article 8(2) 
of the UK-Turkmenistan BIT. The tribunal considered 
that that paragraph contains a “menu of options” and a 
default selection if “there is no agreement to one of the 
above alternative procedure” (i.e., UNICTRAL arbitration) 
(para. 32). The tribunal concluded that under Article 8 
of the BIT Turkmenistan unambiguously consented to 
arbitration but not to ICSID arbitration (paras. 36-38).
Following the establishment of consent to arbitration 
generally, the tribunal moved to the question of whether 
the claimant, through application of the MFN clause 
contained in the UK-Turkmenistan BIT, may rely on 
consent to ICSID arbitration contained in investment 
treaties concluded between Turkmenistan and third 
States. This, the tribunal admitted, is “venturing into 
a fiercely contested non-man’s land in international 
law” (para. 40). The tribunal decided it did not need to 
engage in a thorough interpretation of the MFN clause, 
since the clause in the UK-Turkmenistan BIT explicitly 
applied to investor-State arbitration clauses, which to 
the tribunal’s majority confirmed the parties’ intentions 
to this effect. After discarding other arguments of the 
Respondent in this respect, the majority concluded that, 
as a consequence, the MFN clause should be applied to 
investor-State dispute settlement clauses (para. 64). 
The next step of the tribunal was to apply these 
principles to the case at hand. The claimant had invoked 
the benefit of more favourable dispute settlement 
provisions in multiple treaties, but since the focus was 
placed on the Switzerland-Turkmenistan BIT, the tribunal 
essentially focused on this treaty alone. The tribunal 
examined two separate questions: first, whether consent 
to ICSID arbitration may be ‘imported’ through operation 
of the MFN clause; and secondly, whether treatment of 
foreign investors and investments in the Switzerland-
Turkmenistan BIT is more favourable than treatment 
under the UK-Turkmenistan BIT. 
On the first question, the Turkmenistan had argued that 
the MFN clause may not be used to ‘import’ the State’s 
consent to a different arbitration system from another 
treaty (para. 70 ff). In support of this argument, the 
respondent cited the decision of the tribunal in Maffezini 
v. Spain, the first decision to accept the application of 
MFN clauses to dispute settlement provisions. In that 
decision the tribunal explicitly excluded the invocation of 
MFN clauses “in order to refer the dispute to a different 
system of arbitration.”4 The tribunal, however, accepted 
that the MFN clause in the UK-Turkmenistan BIT, which 
explicitly applies to dispute settlement provisions, may 
be used to rely on more favourable dispute settlement 
clauses, such as the one contained in the Switzerland-
Turkmenistan BIT, because the MFN clause of the UK-
Turkmenistan BIT “effectively replaces Article 8(2) of the 
UK-Turkmenistan BIT with Article 8(2) of the Switzerland-
Turkmenistan BIT, which requires no such case-specific 
consent” (para. 74). The tribunal thus did not argue that 
consent needed to be ‘imported’, since it had already 
established previously that Turkmenistan consented 
generally to arbitration (para. 75). The only provision to 
be ‘imported’ is the “choice between ICSID Arbitration 
and UNCITRAL Arbitration” (para. 75). 
On the second question, whether the UK-Turkmenistan 
BIT provided less favourable treatment than the 
Switzerland-Turkmenistan BIT in respect of dispute 
settlement, the tribunal considered that it is impossible 
to establish, objectively, that ICSID arbitration is more 
favourable than arbitration under the UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules. However, the majority accepted that 
the choice given to investors to choose between both 
types of arbitration is in fact more favourable than BITs 
which restrict the submission of a claim to one system of 
arbitration (paras. 89-95). 
The dissenting opinion
Arbitrator Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, appointed 
by the respondent, issued a powerful dissent, asserting 
that the central question was whether consent to 
ICSID arbitration had been established under the UK-
Turkmenistan BIT (para. 8). Boisson de Chazournes 
considered first that construing Article 8 of the 
UK-Turkmenistan BIT as containing two separate 
provisions—the first paragraph containing the consent 
to arbitration and the second paragraph the arbitration 
system which may be used as a consequence—
disregarded the need to interpret that article as a whole. 
Secondly, the dissenting arbitrator considered that in 
any event, consent to ICSID arbitration in another BIT 
may not be used by a tribunal to find jurisdiction if such 
consent is lacking in the basic treaty (UK-Turkmenistan 
BIT). 
On the first point, Boisson de Chazournes maintained 
that Article 8(1) of the UK-Turkmenistan BIT contains 
consent in principle to arbitration, after a waiting period 
of four months, but that such consent must be read in 
light of the specific conditions governing that consent 
in Article 8(2). In other words, Article 8(1) cannot be 
read in isolation from Article 8(2). The first governs 
the conditions under which an investor can resort 
to arbitration; the second paragraph “fixes the strict 
conditions under which the foreign investor can pursue 
one specific venue for international arbitration” (para. 
19). She considered that the interpretation given by 
the tribunal of Article 8(1) has been used “as a means 
to achieve an end that it could not easily achieve by 
acknowledging that consent to arbitration is contained 
in Article 8(2)” (para. 20). Drawing the conclusion that 
consent has been given in Article 8(1) was according 
to Boisson de Chazournes patently wrong, since it 
confounded the power to initiate arbitration with consent 
to arbitration (para. 21). Article 8(2) indeed states 
that “the national or company and the Contracting 
Party concerned in the dispute may agree to refer 
the dispute either to” the four listed options, implying 
the need for a consent of both the investor and the 
host State to the forum of arbitration (paras. 22 ff). 
This reading, according to Boisson de Chazournes, is 
further confirmed by the last line of Article 8(2), which 
identifies UNITRAL arbitration as the default forum “if 
after a period of four months from written notification 
of the claim there is no agreement to one of the above 
alternative procedures”5 (para. 26). Supplementary 
means of treaty interpretation also confirm such a 
reading of the dispute settlement clause, since the UK-
Turkmenistan BIT contains the ‘alternative’ version of 
the UK Model BIT as opposed to the ‘preferred’ version 
which requires no prior agreement between the foreign 
investor and the host State and gives direct consent to 
ICSID Arbitration (paras. 28-30). 
The dissenting arbitrator then analysed the ordinary 
meaning of the MFN clause in the UK-Turkmenistan BIT 
(Article 3(2)-(3)), which, as mentioned, explicitly applies 
to dispute settlement provisions. This article however 
should be read in light of the other provisions of the 
BIT, and not in isolation, which the majority failed to do 
(paras. 38 ff). Boisson de Chazournes considered that 
the “right” to MFN treatment “can only be exercised if 
the foreign investor and the host State are subject to a 
dispute settlement relationship under one of the dispute 
settlement options that are provided in Article 8(2)”(para. 
41). This is a point that the majority had refused to 
accept, finding “no basis in the U.K.-Turkmenistan 
BIT for conditioning the rights enjoyed by an investor 
under the BIT on the temporal sequence in which the 
investor asserts those rights” (para. 61 of the decision). 
In Boisson de Chazournes’ opinion, MFN treatment in 
respect of ICSID arbitration is simply inapplicable given 
the lack of mutual agreement to ICSID Arbitration (paras. 
43-44). 
Linked to this, Boisson de Chazournes analysed the 
specificity of the ICSID Convention, and in particular the 
need for consent in writing contained in Article 25 of the 
ICSID Convention. Such consent clearly is lacking in this 
case, according to Professor Boisson de Chazournes 
(paras. 46-51). 
On the second question, namely whether, assuming that 
the MFN clause is applicable, one could ‘import’ consent 
to ICSID Arbitration, Boisson de Chazournes pointed to 
several decisions, including Maffezini v. Spain, in which 
tribunals unambiguously stated that the MFN clause may 
not alter an explicit choice of forum. The MFN clause’s 
main objective is not to remedy the absence of consent, 
but rather to ensure that once consent is given, it is 
implemented in the most favourable way compared to 
treaties signed with other States (para. 61). From a more 
systemic perspective, Boisson de Chazournes argued 
that accepting the contrary “would involve a forum-
shopping attitude that bypasses the consent requirement 
of the Respondent while running against the fundamental 
principles of international adjudication” (para. 63). 
A critical assessment of the tribunal’s decision 
The majority’s decision stands out of in relation to many 
other decisions which have discussed the application 
of the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions. 
Indeed, those decisions were mainly concerned with 
pre-arbitration requirements, such as waiting periods or 
exhaustion of domestic remedies requirements. A 2010 
UNCTAD study reveals indeed that the invocation of the 
MFN clause to replace the arbitral forum or rules for the 
settlement of investor-State disputes has never been 
accepted by a tribunal.6 Since then several tribunals 
have equally emphasised, sometimes implicitly, that MFN 
clauses may not be invoked to alter the arbitral forum.7 
Moreover, the few known decisions which have applied 
the MFN clause in order to broaden the scope of the 
legal issues susceptible of being arbitrated are dissimilar 
to the present case.8 
Although the majority’s decision is without doubt well-
argued, there are several interpretative and conceptual 
constructions which leave it open to criticism, as has 
been thoroughly exposed in the dissenting opinion.
First, the tribunal’s interpretation of Article 8 of the UK-
Turkmenistan BIT seems to run counter to the exact 
wording and logic of the clause. To read the first and 
second paragraphs of the clause as two unconnected 
parts of an investor-State dispute settlement clause is 
contrary indeed to the logic behind the Article 8 of the 
UK-Turkmenistan BIT. It seems difficult to dissociate 
the first paragraph from the second, since doing so 
would simply render the second paragraph irrelevant. 
The very fact that in the second paragraph of Article 
8 includes a ‘default’ option in case no agreement is 
reached on any of the listed options seems to clearly 
indicate that specific consent is required in order to 
initiate arbitral proceedings under the ICSID Convention, 
and that consent in fact is only give for arbitration under 
the UNCITRAL arbitration rules—the default option. 
In fact the first paragraph of Article 8 contains only 
pre-arbitration requirement—a waiting period of four 
months—and reading into that paragraph a general 
consent to arbitrate seems to be overly inventive. 
Secondly, there is a question that precedes the 
possible application of the MFN clause, namely 
whether the parties to the dispute are in a “dispute 
settlement relationship,” to use the words of Boisson de 
Chazournes. The argument developed in the dissenting 
opinion echoes the decision of the Tribunal in Diamler v. 
Argentina. The Tribunal there noted:
“... a claimant wishing to raise an MFN claim 
under the German-Argentine BIT – whether 
on procedural or substantive grounds – lacks 
standing to do so until it has fulfilled the domestic 
courts proviso. To put it more concretely, since 
the Claimant has not yet satisfied the necessary 
condition precedent to Argentina’s consent to 
international arbitration, its MFN arguments are 
not yet properly before the Tribunal. The Tribunal 
is therefore presently without jurisdiction to rule on 
any MFN-based claims unless the MFN clauses 
themselves supply the Tribunal with the necessary 
jurisdiction.”9 
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The tribunal’s argument in Daimler, based on the 
decision of the International Court of Justice in the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co case10, is logical in that it provides 
that an MFN-clause, generally, can only be invoked 
if a tribunal first has jurisdiction to entertain a claim; 
the only exception to this being when the MFN clause 
itself provides jurisdiction to the tribunal. Boisson de 
Chazournes takes up this argument in her dissent, 
arguing that since Turkmenistan has not provided 
consent to ICSID arbitration in the basic treaty, the 
claimant is not in a position to invoke the MFN clause. 
The question then is whether, in the absence of consent 
in the basic treaty, the MFN clause itself can provide 
consent. This question is of course related to the 
problem whether one can ‘import’ consent through 
the application of an MFN clause, which Boisson de 
Chazournes categorically refutes. The tribunal in Daimler 
also made the same point.11 The dissenting opinion has 
the merit of pointing to this important aspect of applying 
MFN clauses to dispute settlement provisions, and it 
is regrettable that the majority did not engage with this 
argument.
Thirdly, even if one assumes that the MFN clause applies 
and may be invoked by the claimant, it is doubtful that, 
through operation of that clause, consent to a particular 
form of arbitration may be ‘imported’ from another treaty. 
Here, the relative ease with which the majority discarded 
the paramount need for consent to a specific form 
of arbitration is very much open to criticism. Indeed, 
and this is of course peculiar to international law and 
the involvement of a State, the default principle is that 
international courts and tribunals have no jurisdiction 
unless States have given explicit consent. As such, 
the choice of the specific dispute settlement method 
made by the States needs to be respected. As noted by 
Boisson de Chazournes
‘consent to jurisdiction in international adjudication 
must always be established. First, this is a 
necessary prerequisite to the exercise of the 
international judicial function. The principle of 
compétence de la compétence as defined under 
general international law, and under Article 41 
of the ICSID Convention, empowers an arbitral 
tribunal or any other international court to 
determine proprio motu the extent and limits of 
its jurisdiction. At the same time, the principle 
of compétence de la compétence requires an 
arbitral tribunal or any other international court to 
establish the extent and limits of its jurisdiction 
objectively, i.e., on the basis of the title of 
jurisdiction that is conferred to the said tribunal, 
and not to go beyond it.’12 
‘Importing’ consent to ICSID Arbitration through 
operation of the MFN clause runs counter this 
fundamental principle. The only legal argument one 
can find to accept such a possibility is in the event that 
States parties to the BIT which contains the MFN clause 
have intended that that clause may be invoked in order 
to establish consent – and not just to override pre-
arbitration requirements - expressed in another treaty. In 
such a case consent to arbitration would in fact present 
in the basic treaty. This, however, seems not to have 
been the case in the UK-Turkmenistan BIT, although the 
majority argued otherwise. Linked to this, it should not be 
forgotten that consent to ICSID arbitration, as opposed 
to arbitration generally, is not only subject to the general 
rules of consent to jurisdiction applicable in international 
law, but is specifically addressed in Article 25 ICSID 
Convention which requires “consent in writing”. 
From a systemic perspective, it should also not be 
forgotten that creative findings of jurisdiction may well 
be counterproductive for the system of investment 
treaty arbitration. Considering the recent criticism of the 
system, and the denunciation by several States of the 
ICSID Convention and certain BITs,13 tribunals should 
adhere to the general principles governing consent of 
States to arbitration, in order to avoid creating mistrust 
amongst States towards the ICSID system of arbitration, 
which, one should not forget, has much value in 
providing a neutral forum to settle investment disputes. 
Eric De Brabandere is an associate professor of international law at the Grotius Centre for 
International Legal Studies, Leiden University.
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